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ABSTRACT
Many neuroscientific experiments, based on monitoring brain activity, suggest that it is pos-
sible to predict the conscious intention/choice/decision of an agent before he himself knows 
that. Some neuroscientists and philosophers interpret the results of these experiments as 
showing that free will is an illusion, since it is the brain and not the conscious mind that 
intends/chooses/decides. Assuming that the methods and results of these experiments are 
reliable the question is if they really show that free will is an illusion. To address this problem, 
I argue that first it is needed to answer three questions related to the relationship between 
conscious mind and brain: 1. Do brain events cause conscious events? 2. Do conscious 
events cause brain events? 3. Who is the agent, that is, who consciously intends/chooses/
decides, the conscious mind, the brain, or both? I answer these questions by arguing that 
the conscious mind is a property of the brain due to which the brain has the causal capacity 
to interact adaptively with its body, and trough the body, with the physical and sociocultural 
environment. In other words, the brain is the agent and the conscious mind, in its various 
forms - cognitive, volitional and emotional - and contents, is its guide of action. Based on 
this general view I argue that the experiments aforementioned do not show that free will is 
an illusion, and as a starting point for examining this problem I point out, from some exem-
plary situations, what I believe to be some of the necessary conditions for free will.
Key-words: Agent Brain, conscious mind, free will, Libet-style experiments.
RESUMO
Muitos experimentos neurocientíficos, baseados no monitoramento da atividade cerebral, 
sugerem que é possível predizer as intenções/escolhas/decisões de um agente antes que 
ele mesmo as conheça. Alguns neurocientistas e filósofos interpretam os resultados desses 
experimentos dizendo que o livre-arbítrio é uma ilusão, visto que é o cérebro e não a mente 
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Introduction
Let us assume that the analysis of brain act ivity, using 
brain monitoring technologies - electroencephalography 
(EEG), functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), pos-
itron emition tomography (PET), magnetoencephalography 
(MEG) etc. -, makes it possible to predict a person’s conscious 
intention, choice and decision.2 In other words, let us say that, 
from examining the brain events of a subject A, an experi-
menter B would be able to predict both which act ion A will 
choose among alternatives previously presented to him, and 
when A will consciously decide to initiate the chosen act ion. 
To be more precise, let us suppose a scenario where, from 
monitoring A`s brain act ivity, the experimenter B knows, be-
fore A, not just when A will consciously decide to move one 
of his fingers to press a key, even more, that A will consciously 
choose to move his right index finger, instead of moving his 
left index finger. If that is possible, the following question aris-
es: Did subject A act with free will?
Often, human beings believe that their will is free when 
they feel that they have control over their conscious intentions/
choices/decisions, as in situations in which they do not feel co-
ercion, compulsion or automatism. This belief is usually associ-
ated with a dualistic view of conscious mind and brain relation-
ship, according to which the subject, who perceives himself as 
a conscious subject - and not as a brain -, believes himself to be 
something distinct and irreducible to his brain.3 Experiments 
such as those mentioned above - Libet-style experiments4 -, 
have been used to criticize this also commonsensical dualistic 
belief in free will, as they “demonstrate” that it is the brain of 
the conscious subject, and not the conscious subject himself, 
that controls the conscious intentions/choices/decisions. Ac-
cording to this criticism, the conscious subject, being unable to 
control the preceding brain events, could not control the con-
scious intentions/choices/decisions caused by those. Being the 
conscious subject treated as a puppet of his brain, his free will is 
thought to be an illusion.
My first goal in this paper is to evaluate if this conclu-
sion follows from its premises. In other words, assuming that 
Libet-style experiments5 show that brain events temporally 
precede conscious intentions/choices/decisions, does this 
imply that free will is an illusion? This is a problem, whose 
solution will be based on the answers that I will propose to the 
following questions (taking Libe-style experiments as a guid-
ing thread): 1. Do brain events cause conscious events? 2. Do 
conscious events cause brain events? 3. Who is the agent, that 
is, who consciously intends/chooses/decides, the conscious 
mind, the brain, or both? After answering these three ques-
tions in the next section, arguing that the brain is the agent 
and the conscious mind is its guide to act ion, I will address, in 
the section after the next, the main problem above, focusing 
on the necessary conditions for free will.  
consciente que intenciona/escolhe/decide. Assumindo que os métodos e resultados desses experimentos são confiá-
veis a questão que se coloca é se eles realmente mostram que o livre-arbítrio é uma ilusão. Para tratar desse problema, 
argumento que primeiramente é necessário responder três questões referentes à relação entre mente consciente e cé-
rebro: 1. Eventos cerebrais causam eventos conscientes? 2. Eventos conscientes causam eventos cerebrais? 3. Quem é 
o agente, isto é, que intenciona/escolhe/decide conscientemente, a mente consciente, o cérebro ou ambos? Respondo 
essas questões argumentando que a mente consciente é uma propriedade do cérebro devido à qual o cérebro tem a 
capacidade causal de interagir adaptativamente com seu corpo e, através deste, com o ambiente físico e sociocultural. 
Em outras palavras, o cérebro é o agente e a mente consciente, em suas várias formas - cognitiva, volitiva e emocional - e 
conteúdos, é seu guia de ação. Fundamentado nessa visão geral, argumento que os experimentos acima mencionados 
não demonstram que o livre-arbítrio é uma ilusão, e proponho, a partir de situações exemplares, o que acredito serem 
algumas das condições necessárias para o livre-arbítrio.
Palavras-chave: Cérebro agente, mente consciente, livre-arbítrio, experimentos estilo-Libet.
2 I will use the terms “intention”, “choice” and “decision” with the following meanings: “intention” means “what the conscious agent 
proposes himself to do”; “choice” means “the choice among one of the presented alternatives”; “decision” means “the choice of the 
moment when the chosen action starts”. The term “will”, constitutive element of the expressions “freedom of the will” - free will -, is 
related to the previous terms since that what is at issue is whether the voluntary intention, choice and decision are free.
3 In its most extreme version, the dualism of substance, the conscious subject considers himself as a soul, that is, an immaterial (non-phys-
ical) substance, distinct and independent from the body to which she is connected. The body, being a material (physical) thing, works 
mechanically, like the gears of a clock, or the universe itself, with its laws that allow the prediction of material (physical) events. Free will 
would be a capacity of the immaterial (non-physical) soul, which is not subject to deterministic laws.
4 This is a schematic summary of several experiments in neuroscience, which intend to demonstrate that it is possible to predict the con-
scious intentions/choices/decisions from monitoring and/or manipulating the brain. The most famous are the experiments by Benjamin 
Libet (1985), Chun Siong Soon (2008) and John-Dylan Haynes (2008, 2006), whose main articles are referenced in the end of this paper.
5 I will not discuss the details of Libet-style experiments and the interpretations of their results; that have been done by very qualified 
neuroscientists and philosophers. Assuming that some of the results of these experiments are compatible with a non-reductionist phys-
icalist approach to the relationship between conscious mind and brain - as I will argue in this paper -, my purpose is to examine the 
implications of those for the question of free will.
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1. Brain as Agent and Conscious 
Mind as a Guide of Action
I will assume that Libet-style experiments are consis-
tent with the view that brain events cause conscious mental 
events - upward causation - insofar as they show that partic-
ular brain events temporally precede the subjects’ conscious 
intentions//choices/decisions. I will also assume that these 
experiments are consistent with the view that conscious men-
tal events cause brain events - downward causation - insofar 
as they show that the subject’s conscious intentions/choices/
decisions temporally precede brain events causally respon-
sible for the fulfillment of his voluntary act ion. From these 
assumptions, I will address the following question. If uncon-
scious brain events X temporally precedes conscious inten-
tion/choice/decision Y, and Y temporally precedes an uncon-
scious brain event Z, which causes the movement of the left 
index finger, what would be the cause of Z: X, Y or X/Y?
Answer 1: X causes Z, that is, brain events X, which 
causes the conscious intention/choice/decision Y, also caus-
es the brain event Z; this means that conscious intention/
choice/decision are epiphenomena of the brain. This answer 
is based on two hypotheses. First, X - brain events - is enough 
to explain Z - brain event -; Y - conscious event - is not neces-
sary to explain Z - brain event. Second, explanation based on 
conscious events are unintelligible; conscious events do not fit 
in the sequence of brain events. It could be argued against this 
epiphenomenist view that it not just contradicts our subjec-
tive experience of being the conscious authors of our act ions, 
but it also undermines our intersubjective explanatory prac-
tices based not just on conscious intentions/choices/decision, 
but also on conscious sensations, beliefs, wishes, emotions etc.
Answer 2: Y causes Z, that is, the conscious intention/
choice/decision Y, caused by brain events X, causes by itself 
the brain event Z. The main criticism on this view was men-
tioned above: conscious events are not necessary to explain 
brain events, and do not fit in the sequence of brain events. 
Besides, it does not make sense to argue that conscious events 
have causal power by themselves, that is, apart from the brain, 
insofar as they are properties of the brain, and not properties 
of a Cartesian substance. Strictly sp eaking, there is no down-
ward causation of the conscious mind over the brain.
Answer 3: X/Y cause Z, that is, together, brain events 
X and the conscious intention/choice/decision Y cause the 
brain event Z. In order to explain how X/Y together cause Z, 
I propose that Y be considered a property of X due to which 
X has causal capacities (power to do things) that it would not 
have without Y; in other words, consciousness, in its different 
forms - cognitive, volitive, emotional - and contents, is a prop-
erty of the brain due to which the brain has causal capacities 
that otherwise it would not have. Being the brain embodied, 
many of its capacities related to its conscious experiences de-
pend on the organs and members of its body, which allow it 
to consciously interact with - receive information and act on - 
the external environment; the brain also consciously interacts 
with - receive information and act on - its own body.
Let us see some examples. Visual consciousness is a 
property of the brain due to which the brain has the causal 
capacity to move its body safely in external environment. 
Auditory consciousness is a property of the brain due to 
which the brain has the causal capacity to enjoy a song. 
Taste consciousness is a property of the brain due to which 
the brain has the causal capacity to select a good wine. Ol-
factory consciousness is a property of the brain due to which 
the brain has the causal capacity to identify a rotten food. 
Tact ile consciousness is a property of the brain due to which 
the brain has the causal capacity to read a Braille text. Noci-
ceptive consciousness is a property of the brain due to which 
the brain has the causal capacity to avoid damaging stimuli 
to its body tissues. What was said about conscious bodi-
ly sensations also applies to other forms of consciousness 
such as: cognitive consciousness - intention, decision, belief, 
memory, imagination -, emotional consciousness - fear, sad-
ness, love, hate, guilt, pleasure, displeasure -, and volitional 
consciousness - wishes.
These conscious properties, due to which the brain has 
causal capacities that it otherwise would not have, are used 
by the brain as guides for its voluntary act ion; therefore, they 
are not just epiphenomena of the brain. Let me try to clari-
fy this hypothesis with an example: a piano recital given by 
pianist A. A’s brain has the conscious intention of playing the 
piano, consciously chooses the music to be performed, con-
sciously decides and initiates the motor act ivity involving his 
whole body, esp ecially his arms, hands and fingers. Although 
this motor act ivity responsible for the production of sounds 
is to some extent automatic, conscious proprioception is used 
by the brain as a guide of act ion throughout the presenta-
tion. Even clearer is the role of auditory consciousness as a 
brain act ion guide. Without auditory consciousness, A’s brain 
would not only have serious problems in mastering the flow 
of its presentation; it would not even have learned to play pi-
ano, considering that it would not be able to associate bodily 
movements - hands, fingers etc. - consciously felt to sounds 
consciously heard.
Applying the explanatory scheme just proposed to Li-
bet-style experiments, the relationship between brain and 
conscious mind could be roughly explained in the following 
terms: 1. A’s brain has the conscious intention to take part 
in the experiment according to the experimenter’s instruc-
tions; brain event X1 causes the conscious intention Y1. 2. 
A`s brain consciously choose to move its left index finger; 
brain event X2 causes the conscious choice Y2. 3. A`s brain 
consciously decides to initiate that act ion so causing the 
movement of the left index finger; brain event X3 causes 
the conscious decision Y3, and taking that as a guide, causes 
the brain event Z, which causes the movement of the left 
index finger. Notice that A’s brain not just causes its con-
scious intention/choice/decision from its interact ion with 
the experimental context; A`s brain also uses that conscious 
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events as a guide for its act ions throughout the experiment.6
It is the A`s brain who conscious interact whith its body 
and external physical and sociocultural environment, not 
just  receiving informations that it makes conscious, but also 
consciously intending/choosing/deciding, and using the 
conscious intention/choice/decision as guide to its act ions. 
A`s brain is not just the conscious “patient”, it is the con-
scious agent.7
2. Agent Brain and Free Will
Having interpreted Libet-style experiments from a 
view on the relationship between brain and conscious mind 
according to which the conscious mind is both a brain`s 
property and brain’s guide of act ion, the challenge now is to 
answer the question initially proposed, namely: is free will 
an illusion? To answer this question, I will first take a less 
ambitious path, which is to examine the necessary conditions8
for free will, that is, to reflect on the minimum requirements 
without which free will would be more or less limited. I will 
assume that when it comes to necessary conditions the free 
will should not be treated as an all or nothing, but rather in 
terms of degrees, knowing that it would not be possible to of-
fer a precise mesure to each case. Considering that a reflection 
on necessary conditions for free will must take into account 
the involvement and interact ion among conscious emotional, 
volitional and cognitive events, both properties and guides of 
brain`s act ion, I will first treat each one of these conscious 
events separately, looking for identifying on paradigmatic 
examples what would be the necessary and damaging condi-
tions for free will. After I will take them as a whole, and in 
the following, based on the same principles, I will make some 
comments about free will and sociocultural environment.
I will start with conscious emotional events, taking con-
scious fear as a paradigmatic case. A conscious fear, that is, a 
conscious fear resulting from an adaptive assessment of risk, 
used by the brain as a guide to its intentions/choices/deci-
sions, which the brain feels to control, is a necessary condition
for free will. The same could not be said about conscious fear 
resulting from a non-adaptive assessment of risk such as the
absence of fear in situations of high risk, or the excess of fear in 
situations of low risk - damaging conditions. It does not seem 
that a brain has control over its conscious intentions/choic-
es/decisions when, due to structural/functional casualties, it 
has no conscious fear, so exposing itself to very risky situations, 
such as walking alone in places where the rate of robberies 
and murders is very high. It also does not seem that a brain 
has control over its conscious intentions/choices/decisions 
when, due to structural/functional casualties, it experiences 
extreme conscious fear, so fleeing from situations where the 
risk is very low, such as get in an elevator, traveling by plane 
and go to a supermarket.
Let me now consider the conscious volitional events, 
taking conscious will as a paradigmatic example. A conscious 
will, that is, an adaptive conscious will, used by the brain as 
guide to its conscious intentions/choices/decisions, which the 
brain feels to control, is a necessary condition for free will. The 
same could not be said about cases of absence of conscious will 
in situations where it is necessary for survival, and excess of 
conscious will - compulsions - that endanger life - damaging 
conditions. It does not seem that the brain has control over 
its intentions/choices/decisions when, due to structural/
functional casualties, it has no desire to get out of bed, to eat, 
to work etc., for a long period of time. It also does not seem 
that a brain has control over its intention/choice/decision 
when, due to structural/functional casualties, it compulsively
performs act ions such as those related to addictions: drugs, 
gambling, sex etc.
As paradigmatic examples of conscious cognitive events, 
I will use conscious perception and memory. A conscious per-
ception and memory, that is, an adaptive conscious percep-
tion and memory, used by the brain as guide do its inten-
tions/choices/decisions, which the brain feels to control, is a 
necessary condition for free will. The same could not be said 
about non-adaptive conscious perception and memory, such 
as cases of absence of conscious perception and memory in 
situations where they are necessary for survival, and excess of 
conscious perception and memory that might endanger the 
life - damaging conditions. It does not seem that a brain has 
conscious control over its intentions/choices/decisions in 
cases of total blindness - visual absence - and schizophrenia 
- visual hallucination; the same could be said about memory 
in situations such as Alzheimer`s disease - memory default - 
and hyperthymic syndrome - memory excess.
Although conscious emotional, volitional and cognitive 
events have been considered apart from each other, in general 
6 The brain of subject A, like all brains, has a history, that is, each conscious subject/person is, at each moment of its history, an effect of 
the structure and functionality of his brain - there is no subject/person apart of its brain -, which are constructed by biological processes 
involving genetic programs, and by unconscious and conscious interactions with its body and through its body with the external physical 
and sociocultural environment.
7 I have argued in other texts, from the paradigmatic cases of visual and pain consciousness, that the brain is the agent and the con-
scious mind, resulting from its interaction with the body in which it is embodied and, through its body, with the environment external in 
which it is situated, is its guide of action. I defended that the agent is not a Cartesian person, that is, a conscious substance separable 
and independent of the brain, from where it would receive stimuli and over which it would act. I assume that a person, constituted by 
conscious sensations, memories, imaginations, beliefs, desires, emotions, etc. is inseparable from, dependent and instantiated on the 
brain; in this sense it is as a conscious and self-conscious person that the brain interacts with the body and, through it, with the external 
physical and sociocultural environment.
8 Whether the necessary conditions for free will are also its sufficient conditions is an issue to which I will return in the end of this paper.
Jonas Gonçalves Coelho
82Filosofi a Unisinos – Unisinos Journal of Philosophy – 22(1):78-83, jan/apr 2021 
they are intertwined as the following situation illustrates. A 
tourist walking alone at night is approached by a guard who 
warns him that he is in a very dangerous place. A brain that 
has a “normal” fear in the face of real danger, a “normal” de-
sire to preserve its life and a “normal” reason - inference ca-
pacity - takes the guard’s advice and decides to return to the 
hotel where he is staying; one could say that this brain has 
control over its conscious intentions/choices/decisions. Now 
suppose the tourist’s brain completely ignores the guard’s ad-
vice, decides to move on and, as a result, is murdered; besides 
let us suppose that the autopsy reveals that the tourist’s brain 
had a tumor, which affected his capacity to feel fear, or its 
capacity to control his desires, or his capacity to predict the 
consequences of his act ions. That being the case, it does not 
seem that the tourist’s conscious brain has conscious control 
over its conscious intentions/choices/decisions, that is, that it 
meets the necessary conditions for free will.
I will conclude these brief thoughts on the necessary 
conditions for free will addressing the relationship among the 
brain`s conscious intentions/choices/decisions, its conscious 
emotional/volitional/cognitive capacities and its physical and 
sociocultural environment, from which it gets most of its con-
scious contents. I am not going to say much about the influ-
ence of physical environment on free will, just that environ-
mental “normal” conditions are also necessary for free will. 
It is known that “abnormal” conditions related to extreme 
environmental changes - starvation and violence related to 
very high or low temperatures, for example - affect more or 
less deeply the conscious emotional/volitional/cognitive ca-
pacities of the brain, accordingly its control over its conscious 
intentions/choices/decisions.
What about the relationship between the sociocultural 
environment and free will? What would be the necessary and
damaging conditions for free will? Let us consider the follow-
ing two situations. Situation 1. Subject A, race X, grew up in 
a sociocultural environment in which he received a strict ed-
ucation - family, religion and state - according to which indi-
viduals of race Y are essentially inferior, degenerate and dan-
gerous; individuals Y should serve subjects X. Thus, subject 
A was encouraged from early childhood to love his brothers, 
race X, and to hate the others, race Y. One day, subject A, race 
X, and some friends, beat up an individual B, race Y, to death, 
on the grounds that B had stolen A`s house. Even though A
was not sure that B actually committed the crime, A justified 
his act ion by saying that if it was not B, it was some other 
individual Y, and that B’s death would be an example for all 
individuals Y.
Situation 2. Subject A, race X, grew up in a sociocultural 
environment in which he received a liberal education - family, 
religion and state - according to which A was encouraged to 
weights the arguments for and against the existence of races, 
and on the justifications for and against the intellectual, moral 
and emotional superiority of one race over other. Subject A
was always encouraged to think critically about ethical, reli-
gious and scientific knowledge offered to him. One day, sub-
ject A, race X, and some friends, beat up individual B, race Y, 
to death, for susp ecting that B robbed his house; A justified 
his act ion, claiming that he had seen B nearby shortly before 
the robbery.
Comparing these two situations from what I said earli-
er about the relationship between brain and conscious mind 
allows me to illustrate what I believe to be a necessary con-
dition for free will related to the sociocultural environment. 
I think that A`s brain, in situation 1, has less control over his 
conscious intention/choice/decision than in situation 2.  In 
situation 1, A`s brain was raised in an environment in which 
a unique and non-critical view justifies and encourages his 
prejudiced feelings, wishes and act ions; it is an environment 
which makes it difficult to the A`s brain critically assess its 
intentions/choices/decision related to race - damaging con-
dition. In contrast, in situation 2, A`s brain was raised in an 
environment in which he was encouraged to reflect critically, 
based on favorable and contrary arguments, on his own inten-
tions/choices/decisions related to race. What I am suggest-
ing, from a very simplified description of the two situations, is 
that a sociocultural environment that encourages the exercise 
of critical thinking based on knowledge and reflection on dif-
ferent views of world is - besides a “normal” conscious cogni-
tion, volition and emotion - a necessary condition for brain`s 
control over its conscious intentions/choices/decisions, that 
is, for free will.
Concluding Remarks
From a schematic presentation of Libet-style exper-
iments, I started this paper by wondering whether the as-
sumption that brain events precede conscious intentions/
choices/decisions, which, in turn, precede other brain events 
prior to voluntary act ions, implies that free will is an illusion. 
I have said that the answer to this question depends on how 
one answers three other fundamental questions involving the 
relationship between the conscious mind and the brain. The 
first one is whether brain events cause conscious events; the 
second one is whether conscious events cause brain events; 
the third one is whether the agent of voluntary act ion is the 
conscious mind, the brain, or both. Briefly, my answers, in the 
second section of this paper, were as follows.
I have answered “yes” to the first question, arguing that 
the prediction of conscious intentions/choices/decisions, 
based on the identification of the particular brain events that 
precede them, is compatible with, and strongly suggests that 
brain events cause conscious events. The answer to the sec-
ond question was also “yes”, however highlighting that con-
scious events are not a Cartesian substance, but properties 
of the brain due to which the brain has causal capacities that 
it otherwise would not have; being brain`s guides of act ion, 
the conscious events are not epiphenomenal properties. The 
answer to the third question is implied by the answers to the 
previous questions, that is, by defending that the conscious 
mind is a property of the brain, due to which the brain has 
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the causal capacity to interact with the body and, through it, 
with the external environment, I was suggesting that the brain 
is the agent, that is, it is the brain that consciously intends/
chooses/decides, and does it based on the conscious contents 
of its knowledges, wills and emotions.9
Back to the initial question, I agree with the interpre-
tations of Libet-style experiments according to which free 
will is an illusion. However, I believe that this criticism ap-
plies only to the view that the conscious mind is the agent; Li-
bet-style experiments do not show that free will is an illusion 
if the conscious brain is the agent. Would free will be an illu-
sion if the brain is the agent and the conscious mind its guide 
of act ion? Assuming that the brain, embodied and socio-cul-
turally situated, is the agent that uses its conscious mind, in 
its various forms - cognitive, volitional, emotional - and con-
tents, as guides of its voluntary act ion, I briefly presented, in 
the second section, what I consider to be the necessary con-
ditions for the brain to have control over its conscious inten-
tions/choices/decisions, that is, for the brain to have free will. 
Although the description of exemplary situations had been 
oversimplified, I believe that for the moment it is enough to 
illustrate what would be a free will approach focused on its 
necessary conditions assuming that the brain is the agent and 
the conscious mind is its guide of act ion.
The question that arises from there is whether these 
necessary conditions for the brain to have control over its con-
scious intentions/choices/decisions would also be sufficient 
conditions for free will. This is a more difficult question than 
the previous one, the hard problem of free will, derived from 
the fact that the agent brain certainly does not have control 
over an important part of its past physical and sociocultural 
history, which is crucially associated to what it currently is. 
From the physical point of view, it should be considered that 
the agent brain has a history which involve a genetic program 
and biological processes inherent to its development in the 
mother`s body and early childhood, this one related to the ef-
fects of chemical substances constituting consumption habits 
and the environment of the mother - food, drugs, pollution 
etc. The history of the agent brain also includes its sociocul-
tural environment with which it consciously interact ed, even 
before birth, being significant the quality of social relations 
and the ethical, religious, scientific education of the people 
close to it. Being the agent brain inseparable from its past his-
tory, which he did not control, could it have control over his 
present and future intentions/choices/decision? Answering 
this question, to examine more deeply the necessary condi-
tions for free will, and reflect on the relationship between free 
will and moral responsibility will be the next step of my work 
on free will from the assumption that the brain is the agent 
and the conscious mind is its guide of act ion.
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9 I am arguing that the agent is not a kind of Cartesian person, that is, a conscious substance separable and independent of the brain, 
with which mysteriously would interact. I assume that a person, constituted by conscious sensations, memories, imaginations, beliefs, 
desires, emotions etc. is inseparable from, dependent and instantiated on the brain; it means that it is as a conscious and self-conscious 
person that the brain interacts with the body and, through it, with the external physical and sociocultural environment.
